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‘But then they started all this killing.’1 
Attitudes to the IRA in the Irish Republic since 1969 
 
This article examines one of the most intense divisions between Irish nationalists 
during the Northern Ireland conflict. The Provisional IRA claimed to be waging a 
similar war to that of the IRA of the revolutionary era (1916-1921); an assertion 
disputed by many. The argument was significant because all the major political forces 
in the Irish Republic honoured the memory of what they called the ‘old’ IRA (defined 
in a popular school history book as ‘the men who fought for Irish freedom between 
1916 and 1923’).2 They argued that in contrast to the Provisionals, the ‘old’ IRA 
possessed a democratic mandate and avoided causing civilian casualties. Echoes of 
these disputes resurfaced during Sinn Féin’s bid for the Irish presidency during 2011. 
Commemorating Denis Barry, an Anti-Treaty IRA prisoner who died on hunger strike 
in 1923, Fianna Fáil leader Micheál Martin claimed that in contrast to men like Barry 
‘those who waged war in Northern Ireland during the more recent Troubles were an 
impediment to Irish unity and directly responsible for causing distress and grief to 
many families. Yet they still seek to hijack history and the achievements of the noble 
people who fought for Ireland in our War of Independence…to justify their terrorist 
campaign.’3 This article contends that while republicans and some of their critics 
rejected these arguments they constituted an important factor in denying legitimacy to 
the Provisional IRA’s armed struggle. Tracing attitudes to an illegal organization is 
problematic and issues of class and regional variations in support can be important 
factors.4 I will attempt to suggest ways in which historians can interrogate journalism, 
opinion polls and archival material to illustrate popular mentalities. I will also 
examine how republicans themselves attempted to contest criticisms of their 
campaign.  
 
                                                 
1 Irish Times, 18 Feb. 1980.  
2 Mark Tierney & Margaret MacCurtain, The Birth of Modern Ireland (Dublin, 1969) 
p. 188. The authors stressed that these men ‘were not to be confused’ with later 
organisations using the IRA title.  
3 Irish Times, 21 Nov. 2011. 
4 See Bernadette C. Hayes & Ian McAllister, ‘Public Support for Political Violence 
and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland’ in Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 17, (2005) p. 599-617.  
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Martin’s 2011 statement echoed the arguments of leading Fianna Fáil figures from the 
early 1970s. In November 1972 Jack Lynch asserted that his party was the ‘direct 
descendent of the Old IRA: the true IRA, which would have nothing to do those who 
now claim to be the IRA’.5 In January 1973 Minister for Finance George Colley 
denounced ‘the various groups who call themselves the IRA’ for ‘desperately trying 
to fool the Irish people into believing that they are fighting the same fight and have 
the same moral authority as the real IRA.’ Colley asserted that ‘old’ IRA veterans 
were disgusted by the way ‘the name of and honour of the Irish Republican Army’ 
was being ‘abused.’ Those who ‘recklessly expose civilians to the risk of death and 
injury when they placed their bombs’ were blemishing the reputation of ‘the real IRA 
(who) were the army of the democratically elected parliament of the nation.’ Crucially 
Colley argued, ‘the old IRA…was responsible to the elected representatives of the 
people in Dáil Éireann. The groups today styling themselves the IRA were 
responsible to no one.’6  
 
Fine Gael, while usually perceived as more ‘moderate’ nationalists than Fianna Fáil7, 
also retained a strong identification with the independence struggle, particularly with 
Michael Collins, described by party leader Liam Cosgrave as ‘the man who above all 
others (had) achieved success against the ancient enemy.’8 During 1984 Fine Gael 
Minister for Justice Michael Noonan would assert that ‘our generation of the Irish 
owes more to Collins than to any other hero’ and promised that ‘in our dealings with 
the British we will, like Collins, have no illusions about their grá for this country.’ 
But neither would Fine Gael let the IRA exploit ‘the undeniable misery of northern 
nationalists’ and ‘the resentment we in the South correctly feel at Britain’s repeated 
failures to right these wrongs.’ Fine Gael were also adamant that the modern IRA had 
no right to claim on the title of the organization Collins once led.9 While the party 
                                                 
5 Irish Times, 29 Nov. 1972. 
6 Irish Times, 20 Jan. 1973. 
7 Henry Patterson, ‘‘Deeply anti-British’? The Irish State and Cross-Border Security 
Cooperation, 1970-1974’ Political Studies Association of Ireland (Dublin, 2011) p. 2.  
8 Irish Times, 20 May 1972. 
9 Irish Times, 27 Aug. 1984.  
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would embrace a much less nationalist image by the 1990s, the views expressed by 
Cosgrave and Noonan retained support within it.10 
  
The Labour Party too, contained a vocal republican wing, especially during the early 
1970s.11 An opinion poll during 1970 found almost twenty-five percent of Labour 
supporters in favour of armed intervention during a crisis situation in Northern 
Ireland, compared to 18% in Fianna Fáil and 12% in Fine Gael.12 Twenty years later 
the party’s leading left-wing figure Michael D. Higgins, would recount with pride his 
family’s anti-Treaty history, including his father’s imprisonment during the Civil 
War. But he firmly rejected any link to the present ‘I do not accept that the 
(Provisonal) IRA is in a direct line from the Independence struggle. You cannot, at 
this stage, with so many civilian casualties, with so many maimed and injured, say 
that this is the path towards the resolution of the problems on this island.’13  
 
Significantly it was not only politicians who made such claims. In 1980 Bishop 
Cathal Daly argued that while the title ‘Irish Republican Army’, and ‘the noble name 
and record which it earned 60 years ago’ still evoked ‘powerful emotional responses’ 
those ‘who usurp the name now have no right… historical or moral, to use it.’ The 
modern IRA’s ‘methods…aims (and) ideology’ made them as ‘implacably dedicated 
to the subversion of the very institutions of independence set up in this part of Ireland 
as the result of the 1916-1921 struggle of the authentic Army of the Irish Republic, as 
they are to the overthrow of the organs of British Government in the North.’14  
 
Despite such assertions, many suggested that the revolutionary legacy of the Southern 
state did give credence to republican paramilitaries. Conor Cruise O’Brien stressed 
that the prevailing ideology of the Irish republic, which justified armed force, 
                                                 
10 Michael Gallagher & Michael Marsh, Days of Blue Loyalty: The Politics of 
Membership of Fine Gael (Dublin, 2002) pp. 164-165, pp. 186-187. See also remarks 
by John Deasy TD in Irish Independent, 8 Nov. 2002. 
11 Niamh Puirséil, The Irish Labour Party 1922-73 (Dublin, 2007) pp. 288-299. 
12 Michael Gallagher, The Irish Labour Party in Transition, 1957-82 (Manchester, 
1982) p. 142.  
13 Hot Press, 8 Sept. 1993.  
14 Irish Times, 1 Jan. 1980. 
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legitimized the IRA’s armed struggle.15 He believed that the Provisionals ‘hold the 
warrant from Pearse and the democratic nationalists can say as long as they like that 
they don’t, but they do, and their strength deep down is that everybody knows that 
they do…they are acting on a faith and credo that the rest of us claim to be living by, 
but don’t really live by. The Provos make people feel dishonest and a little shaky.’16 
Journalist Olivia O’Leary echoed this point, arguing that to people ‘weaned on the 
legend of 1916, the War of Independence, with a war song for a national 
anthem…there is nothing alien about the concept of using force.’ Though some acts 
of violence might appall, the historical legacy of the independence struggle facilitated 
a ‘no-go area in the Irish public conscience’ for the IRA, at least as far as cooperation 
with the British was concerned.’17 So despite official condemnation of the IRA and 
poor results for their supporters in elections, popular hostility to their activities could 
not be taken for granted. A Hot Press columnist and critic of the Provisionals 
identified this sympathy as ‘ the Wolfe Tone’s Syndrome’ (after the music group).18 
This was, they suggested, the ‘very unhealthy interface between the southern folk 
memory of the War of Independence and the modern guerilla war in the North’ often 
expressed in pub ballad sessions. Some dismissed this, arguing that since Sinn Féin 
polled poorly in elections nostalgic republicanism represented only ‘drink 
talking...emotive oul shite.’ But, contended the Hot Press critic ‘the Physical Force 
people listen in on a Wolfe Tones gig, or a singing bar, or a quiet bar where opinions 
are generously inflected with nods and winks, and they’ll argue that the ballot box is 
breadbasket voting, and that ‘the people’ are ‘sound on the National Question.’19 This 
view, of a large, if submerged constituency for the IRA, was one that both republicans 
and some of their critics shared.  
 
Modern republicans refused to accept that their struggle was in any way different 
from that of the ‘old’ IRA. Provisional leader Ruairí Ó Brádaigh responded to Cathal 
Daly’s critique by claiming that ‘the only difference between the current phase of the 
age old Irish republican struggle and any other former generation is that it has gone on 
                                                 
15 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Herod: Reflections on Political Violence (London, 1978) p. 
11, p. 137.  
16 Fortnight, No. 216, March 18-31, 1985.  
17 Irish Times, 20 Feb. 1980. 
18 See interview with Wolfe Tones, Hot Press, 14 Aug. 1986. 
19 ‘The Whole Hog’ Hot Press, 16 Aug. 1990. 
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longer, has achieved more, and is nearer ultimate success than anything in the past.’20 
In 1974 An Phoblacht stated that ‘in no essential way are the leaders of the 
Republican Movement today different from those of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, of the IRA, of the Irish Volunteers and members of the Citizens Army 
in 1916...the objective remains unchanged. The strategy remains unchanged. Only the 
tactics are different-but not all that different-and, of course the weapons.’21 It was an 
potent assertion. As one man, angry at the government’s clampdown on republican 
activists wrote to Jack Lynch ‘any denunication of modern IRA activity must serve 
also as a condemnation of all those patriots and martyrs of yesteryear your very 
government revere today.’22 By the 1980s republicans were happy to concede that ‘far 
from the romanticism, which has often been attached to the conduct of the Tan War, 
people, both innocent, and guilty, died.’23 In 1985 Sinn Féin published a pamphlet, 
The Good Old IRA, which outlined, in grim detail, incidents where civilians were 
killed both accidentally and deliberately, by the ‘old IRA.’24 The purpose of this 
pamphlet was to expose the ‘hypocrisy of those in the establishment who rest self-
righteously on the rewards of those who in yesteryear’s freedom struggle made the 
supreme sacrifice.’25 
 
Uncomfortably for those who suggested a moral chasm existed between them, there 
were several ‘old’ IRA veterans prepared to endorse the Provisionals. To republicans, 
men like Tipperary’s Dan Gleeson, (who joined the Irish Volunteers in 1917) 
symbolized the ‘unbroken chain which links earlier phases of the republican struggle 
to today’s struggle for freedom.’26 During 1972 Tom Malone (‘Seán Forde’ of the 
Limerick IRA during the 1919-21 period) refuted the suggestion ‘that veterans of the 
war do not support the fight in the North against Britain.’27 Easter Rising veteran (and 
Free State Army officer) Commandant W.J. Brennan-Whitmore argued during 1975 
                                                 
20 An Phoblacht/Republican News 20 Jan. 1980 
21 An Phoblacht, 20 Dec. 1974.  
22 J.J. Arthur to Jack Lynch, 28 Nov. 1972, (National Archives of Ireland (NAI) 
Department Taoiseach, (D/T) 2003/16/590). 
23 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 9 Feb. 1984 
24 Sinn Féin Publicity Department, The Good Old IRA: Tan War Operations (Dublin, 
1985). 
25 Ibid. p. 1.  
26 An Phoblacht/Republican News 7 Nov. 1985 
27 An Phoblacht, 10 Dec. 1972. 
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that he could not ‘see any difference, moral or legal, between the fight now being 
waged by the present generation IRA, and that waged by the IRA of my generation. 
The objective of both is precisely the same-the liberation of our beloved country from 
foreign domination.’28 Even veterans critical of the Provisionals, such as Peadar 
O’Donnell, would accept that while ‘British occupation takes place in any part of 
Ireland, there will be young people that will take up a rifle and have a crack at them. 
And you may say its daft and its foolish but it has the sanction of the whole of Irish 
history.’29 Mainstream politicians who questioned the legitimacy of the Provos faced 
embarrassing reminders of their own legacy. Republican MP Owen Carron asserted 
during 1981 that ‘it is by armed insurrection and rebellion that the Irish Free State 
exists today...if a thing was legitimate in 1920, I don’t see what makes it illegitimate 
in 1981...Dr. (Garret) FitzGerald’s father and his comrades shot RIC policemen. That 
is how they came to power through the shooting of Catholic RIC policemen...’30 
 
It is also clear that at various points, popular support for the IRA did exist in the 
Republic of Ireland. While it is not true that the IRA was ‘practically extinct’ before 
the outbreak of violence in Belfast during August 1969, it was after that event that the 
organisation began to attain a level of public sympathy denied to it since the 1930s.31 
In late 1971 Irish Military Intelligence estimated that there were ‘20/40,000 active 
supporters’ of the IRA in the Republic.32 British ambassador John Peck noted in early 
1972 ‘a rapid increase throughout the Republic of popular support, particularly among 
the young, for both branches of the IRA.’33 In May that year his colleagues found that 
identification with the IRA’s aims was ‘widespread and can fluctuate violently 
according to emotion over events in the North.’ However while ‘a majority of the 
population support the IRA’s main aim…only a minority-say 10%- are prepared to 
countenance the use of violence. Perhaps 3% are willing to take part in IRA activities, 
                                                 
28 An Phoblacht, 31 Jan. 1975.  
29 Magill, Feb. 1983.  
30 Irish Times, 27 Aug. 1981.  
31 John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images 
(London, 1995) p. 259. See Brian Hanley & Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: the 
Story of the Official IRA and the Workers Party (Dublin, 2009) pp. 108-130.  
32 C/S T.L. Ó Cearbhail, ‘Military considerations’ 23 Aug. 1971, (University College 
Dublin Archives, Patrick Hillery Papers, P205/37). 
33 John Peck, ‘Republic of Ireland: Annual Review for 1971’ 10 Jan. 1972, (National 
Archives, Kew, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 87/7).   
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and the number of those doing so is even smaller. Nevertheless, the IRA groups to 
some degree speak for the conscience of “loyal” Irishmen and sympathy for them, 
however irrational and inert, should not be underestimated.’34 A key event in 
radicalizing opinion had been Bloody Sunday. In the wave of protest that followed 
open expressions of support for the IRA were commonplace. At Kilkenny 
Corporation Councillor T. Delaney asserted, in terms echoed at similar meetings 
across the state, ‘I take my hat off to them (the IRA) and salute them as the true 
freedom fighters of the country.’35 Armed IRA volunteers appeared at rallies and IRA 
members addressed demonstrations and council meetings.36 Historian F.S. L. Lyons 
was one of those who ‘certainly got the impression following the Derry shootings of 
something approaching a post-1916 mood.’37 It was little wonder that the Provisionals 
believed that ‘we are going to win…for the first time in possibly 800 years the whole 
Irish Nation is on the march for full freedom.’38 
 
But in 1972 attitudes were complicated by the fact there were two IRAs: Official and 
Provisional. Fine Gael TD Paddy Belton claimed that among Fianna Fáil supporters 
the view was that “the Official IRA were no good but there was some good in the 
Provos”’.39 Popular cleric Fr. Michael Cleary expressed this view on the Late Late 
Show suggesting that ‘the Provisionals are the genuine successors of the Sinn Fein 
movement we knew some years ago. I don’t always agree with their tactics and 
campaigns in the North, but I do respect them and admire their sense of nationalism. 
The other crowd-the Officials-are Communist-inspired and controlled.’40 There is 
some evidence that such views had currency in official circles. In 1974 a major report 
into state security was compiled for Justice Thomas Finlay after consultation between 
                                                 
34 ‘State of Security-The Irish Republic’, 19 May 1972, (National Archives, Kew, 
CAB 134/3574).  
35 Kilkenny People, 4 Feb. 1972. 
36 The Kerryman, (North Cork edition) 5 Feb. 1972, Munster Express, 4 Feb. 1972, 
Longford Leader, 4. Feb. 1972, Drogheda Independent, 4. Feb 1972, Herald and 
Western Advertiser, 5 Feb. 1972.  
37 F.S.L. Lyons to G. FitzGerald, 17 Feb. 1972 (University College Dublin Archives, 
Garret FitzGerald Papers P215/4). 
38 An Phoblacht, March 1972. 
39 Irish Times, 2 Dec. 1972. 
40 Sunday Independent, 12 Dec. 1971. 
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government departments, Gardaí and the Army.41 Finlay found that ‘it is an agreed 
view submitted to me that the greatest long-term danger to the security of the 
institutions of the State comes from the activities of the Official IRA and of political 
groups or associations connected with it.’ The Provisionals, in contrast were thought 
to be focused on the North though their ‘apparent policy of avoiding militant action 
within the State could be changed by a number of factors, such as the introduction of 
internment, or the institution of direct co-operation between the Gardaí and the British 
Army.’42 This suggests that the Officials socialism and links with international 
communism worried the government more at this point than the Provisional’s 
seemingly more ‘traditional’ anti-partitionism.43  
 
But popular sympathy for either IRA would decrease rapidly. By June 1972 Hibernia 
magazine discerned that republicans were ‘losing public support North and South of 
the border. Indeed their isolation was almost complete...the IRA had never been more 
cut off from public support.’44 Fianna Fáil faced a republican challenge in a bye-
election in Mid Cork during that August. The Aontacht Eireann45 party contested the 
election, its leader, former Fianna Fáil minister Kevin Boland, declaring that ‘armed 
resistance is justified…the enemy of the Irish people is still the same enemy that was 
successfully engaged in places like Crossbarry and Kilmichael-and co-operation with 
that enemy at present operating in the Six Counties means the same thing now as it 
did then.’46 Boland argued that the bye-election was of ‘exceptional national 
importance’ and an opportunity to reject Jack Lynch’s policy on the North.47 But the 
                                                 
41 The report was commissioned after the escape of senior Provisional IRA members 
from Mountjoy Prison in 1973. It was not published but sections of it were quoted in 
the Barron Commission report on the Dublin/Monaghan bombings.  
42 Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Womens Rights, Report of 
Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings 
(Dublin, 2003). p. 34. 
43 British diplomats had informed Dublin during 1972 of Soviet connections to the 
OIRA. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Telegram No. 106, 26 Feb. 1972, 
(National Archives, Kew, Prem 15/1046). 
44 Hibernia, 9 June 1972.  
45 Established in 1971 by former Fianna Fáil members who felt the party had 
abandoned republicanism under Jack Lynch. 
46 Irish Times, 24 July 1972.  
47 Irish Times, 29 July 1972.  
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government won easily, taking 50% of the vote.48 Boland’s party gained 1,172 votes, 
less than 3% of the poll.49 
 
The carnage in the North over the summer of 1972, much of it caused by IRA bombs 
and the increasing street violence associated with Northern issues in the republic 
contributed to this decline in sympathy. In December 1972 the government was able 
to implement harsh anti-IRA measures, despite vocal concerns about civil liberties. 
But these measures also attracted support, one Tipperary correspondent informing 
Lynch that ‘the silent majority are with you...I would like you to know that the 
ordinary farmers and workers down the country are with you all the way. Violence 
will not end and peace we will not have, until people who preach violence 
are...brought to justice.’50 Thereafter there was little evidence of electoral support for 
the IRA. In 1973 Official Sinn Féin won just 1.14%, and Aontacht Eireann 0.91%, of 
the vote in the republic’s general election.51 In local elections the following year 
Provisional Sinn Féin won 26 seats on local government bodies.52 In 1979 the party 
took 2.16% of the vote and won 30 seats.53 Despite abandoning its abstentionist 
policy towards Leinster House in 1986 the party’s vote in Dáil elections actually 
declined, to just 1.6% by 1992.54 It was comforting then, for some to believe the 
colourful words of Fine Gael TD John Kelly, that southern support for IRA violence 
was restricted to ‘a few thousand half-wits and savage old hillbillies.’55  
 
But republicans argued that their popular base could not be judged by election results. 
As An Phoblacht’s columnist ‘Freeman’ asserted in 1974 ‘practical sympathy with 
militant Republicans is not reflected in support for Republican candidates. There is a 
great disproportion between the one and the other, to put it mildly.’56 A decade later 
                                                 
48 Hibernia, 25 Aug. 1972. 
49 Michael Gallagher, (Ed) Irish Elections, 1948-77: Results and Analysis (Oxon, 
2009) p. 272.  
50 D. Hunt to J. Lynch, 28 Nov. 1972 (NAI, D/T 2003/16/590). 
51 Gallagher, Irish Elections, p. 311. Provisional Sinn Féin did not contest the 1973 
general election.  
52 Irish Times, 21 Feb. 1980.  
53 Irish Times, 17 Oct. 1979. 
54 Paul Mitchell ‘The 1992 General Election in the Republic of Ireland’ in Irish 
Political Studies, Vol. 8, (1993) p. 116.  
55 Irish Times, 31 August 1979. 
56 An Phoblacht, 5 July 1974.  
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Danny Morrison57 complained that ‘people try to make a defeat for Sinn Féin into a 
defeat for the IRA. But it’s just not so, because Fianna Fáil, and to some extent Fine 
Gael, grassroots supporters support the IRA. That’s how the IRA is able to exist.’ 58 
Gerry Adams asserted that he had ‘met members of every party in the 26 counties 
who are in some sense supporters of the IRA, or who have a sneaking regard for the 
IRA.’59 As an ‘active IRA gunman’ Seán O’Callaghan claimed he ‘stayed in houses 
owned by Fianna Fáil supporters. I was driven by them and helped by them in all 
manners of ways. Fianna Fáil supporters were the most helpful, followed by those of 
the Irish Labour Party, particularly in the border and rural areas.’60 John Healy of the 
Irish Times agreed, declaring that ‘the Irish will give the IRA everything but the 
vote…we’ll give them safe houses, we’ll put money in the collection boxes, we’ll 
give them big funerals, we’ll give them verbal support-but when they put their names 
on the ballot paper, the Irish draw the line there.’61 
 
There was some evidence for these claims. Songs celebrating the escape of IRA men 
from Mountjoy and Portlaoise prisons topped the Irish pop charts in 1973 and 1974.62  
Republicans believed the success of Dermot Hegarty’s ‘19 Men’, a number one hit 
despite being banned from radio, was ‘confirmation that the Portlaoise jail-break had 
stirred the nation.’63 How that number of escapees could find shelter in such a ‘small 
and intimate society’ worried Minister for Justice Paddy Cooney.64 A survey of 
attitudes among 1,300 young people, published in 1976, found that there was a 
‘strong minority favouring the use of force to end British rule in Northern Ireland. It 
is located primarily among the younger students and those representing the farm and 
manual labour socio-economic groups. The slim majority who oppose the use of force 
on this issue draw their strongest support from the older students and from the 
                                                 
57 Editor of An Phoblacht/Republican News from 1979 and Sinn Féin director of 
publicity throughout the 1980s. 
58 Padraig O’Malley, The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today (Boston, 1997 ed.)  p. 276.  
59 Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom (Dingle, 1986) p. 46. 
60 Fortnight, October 2002. 
61 Irish Times, 20 Oct. 1979. 
62 Larry Gogan, Larry Gogan’s Pop File, (Dublin, 1979) p. 169-170.  
63 An Phoblacht, 27 Sept. 1974. 
64 Hibernia, 27 Sept. 1974. 
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professional-management and non-manual labour catogeries.’65 In the view of one 
teenager, the ‘old’ and ‘new’ IRA were ‘more or less the same…they were fighting to 
free the country way back. They are doing the same thing now.’66 29.6% of 
respondents agreed the IRA were ‘doing what is neccesary’ in Northern Ireland, while 
5.9% thought them ‘national heroes.’ But the survey also found that 18% thought the 
IRA ‘vicious gunmen and killers’ while 33.8% believed the organization was 
‘harming Ireland.’67 Mícheál MacGréil’s groundbreaking study of  attitudes in 
Dublin, conducted between 1972-73, found strong levels of hostility to both the 
Provisonal and Official IRA with 28.9% and 22.0% respectively in favour of jailing 
their members.68 However a relatively high 35% agreed with the proposition that in 
Northern Ireland ‘the use of violence, while regrettable, has been neccesary for the 
achievment of non-Unionist rights.’69 A 1978 ESRI  survey indicated that ‘opposition 
to IRA activities is not overwhelming and certainly does not match the strong 
opposition so often articulated by public figures.’70  That survey found that 21% 
claimed to support the IRA, though of this figure, only 8% were ‘moderately to 
strongly supportive.’ Support was stronger among men than women, among rural 
rather than urban dwellers, and higher in those over 40 years of age and of lower 
occupational status. However it was also the case ‘those who are more interested in 
politics and involved in political discussion (and) …attentive to political 
communication tend to be more anti-partitionist, more supportive of IRA activities 
(and) more sympathetic to IRA motives.’71 A majority (61%) remained opposed to 
IRA activities, with 63% favouring tougher government measures against the 
organisation. Even though there was ‘no evidence that an attitude of support…leads to 
any concrete actions’, the authors stressed that ‘the stark fact remains that 21% of the 
                                                 
65 John Raven , C.T. Whelan, Paul A. Pfretzschner & Donald M. Borock, Political 
Culture in Ireland: the Views of Two Generations (Dublin, 1976) p. 131.  
66 Ibid. p. 129. 
67 Ibid. pp. 127, 187.  
68 Mícheál McGréil, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ireland: Based on a Survey of 
Intergroup Attitudes of Dublin Adults and Other Sources (Dublin, 1977) p. 415. 
69 Ibid. p. 387. 
70 E. E. Davis & Richard Sinnott., Attitudes in the Republic of Ireland Relevant to the 
Northern Ireland Problem: Vol. 1. Dublin Economic and Social Research Institute 
Paper No. 97, (September, 1979) pp. 98-99. 
71 Ibid. p. 116.  
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population emerge as being in some degree supportive in their attitude to IRA 
activities.’72  
 
Political responses to the poll were not only negative but ‘characterized by 
extraordinary vehemence and intensity’, many contrasting it with an IMS survey the 
previous year that had suggested just 2% support for the IRA.73 Labour party leader 
Frank Cluskey described the ESRI study as ‘highly irresponsible’ and suggested that 
it would ‘reinforce the Provisional IRA and their fund-raising activities.’74 Predictably 
republicans were more positive, An Phoblacht’s headline declaring ‘IRA Okay! 
Lynch up the poll.’75 A correspondent suggested that ‘despite all the brain-washing, 
all the black propaganda’ the results showed that there was still ‘a fountain of 
goodwill’ for republicans and that with ‘free speech’ support would be ‘not 21 per 
cent’ but ‘91 per cent.’76 The idea that such a latent constituency existed was a 
powerful one. It meant Provisional councillors such as Galway’s Frank Glynn and 
Leitrim’s John Joe McGirl could argue that successful IRA operations which resulted 
in British Army fatalities would gain ‘70% acceptance’ privately, ‘despite the public 
outcry about it’ and that if people ‘thought you were winning the war in Northern 
Ireland you would get a landslide.’77 
 
 
As to why this support was not more apparent, Gerry Adams blamed the fact that 
southerners were ‘reared in an atmosphere of revisionism.’78 Danny Morrison 
believed that there was an ‘apalling degree of ignorance down there about the 
situation in the North… revisionism and censorship have conspired to de-humanise 
Republicanism in the South especially among young people.’79 A young IRA member 
                                                 
72 Ibid. p. 98. 
73 E.E. Davis & Richard Sinnott., ‘The Controversy Concerning Attitudes In The 
Republic To The Northern Ireland Problem’ in Studies, Autumn/Winter, 1980 p. 179-
92.  A counter report was undertaken and published a year later. See T. J. Baker, D. 
Hannan, D. Rottman and B. Walsh., Critique of ESRI paper No. 97, (June- August, 
1980) (NAI, D/T 2010/53/877). 
74 Irish Times, 17 Oct. 1979. 
75 An Phoblacht/Republican News 20 Oct. 1979. 
76 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 27 Oct. 1979. 
77 Irish Times, 21 Feb 1980. 
78 Hot Press, 19 May. 1993. 
79 Hot Press, 14 Dec. 1989. 
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from Derry graphically expressed his frustration with RTE for having Unionist MP 
‘Ken Maginnis on every show it can squeeze him on...but actual Nationalism is 
censored. It makes me bitter. It really does.’80 Some commentators agreed that 
measures such as Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act contributed to an atmosphere 
where any republican views were suspect. Radio One’s Joe Duffy claimed that 
‘Section 31 has a strong domino effect in RTE. If you say you’re a republican that’s 
usually taken to mean you’re a baby killer.’81 How much impact such censorship had 
is extremely difficult to assess, as many television viewers in the republic had access 
to British television broadcasts, from which Sinn Féin was not banned until 1988.82 
Republicans identified as ‘revisionism’, not historians reinterpreting the past but what 
they alleged were attempts to rehabilitate British rule and demonise past resistance to 
it.83 This revisionism was particuarly associated with Cruise O’Brien and other 
commentators such as Ruth Dudley Edwards and the extent to which this influenced 
popular attitudes remains contested.84 
 
But a major problem for the Provisionals concerned the refusal of many southerners 
to accept that their armed struggle was legitimate. During 1980, Paul Farrell, an army 
cadet from Dublin suggested that ‘the Provisionals are the very antithesis of what the 
army stands for here. Their methods are those of the common gangster. I don’t see 
that the term ‘army’ can apply to them at all. God knows what sort of a state we 
would be living under if the Provos got their way here.’85 Pat O’Neill an 18-year old 
Tipperary farmer felt distant from the conflict; ‘what happens up there doesn’t really 
affect me…of course Tipperary has a bit of an IRA tradition but I don’t think the 
whole business enters young people’s heads very often here.’ Similarly June 
Fitzgibbon from Limerick had never been to Northern Ireland and had no interest in 
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going there. She felt that ‘the British are doing no good there at all’ but did not 
‘approve of this ‘Brits out, peace in’ thing. It doesn’t make sense to me. If the Brits 
did get out there’d still be Protestants and Catholics up there shooting at each other. 
There’d still be trouble.’86 These views seemed to confirm Anthony Cronin’s 
suggestion during 1979 that ‘nobody is listening…the fact is that response to the 
Provisional’s appeals on any issue whatsoever, H-Block included, is really dead in the 
South. Even if the old Civil Strife and massacre of Catholics situation were to come 
about at last, the South would not respond.’87 This judgement was accepted, at least in 
part, by the Provisional’s rivals in the Irish Republican Socialist Party who suggested 
that ‘the confusion of the Irish working class in the face of the war of national 
liberation today is as great as was the bewilderment of the citizens of Dublin 
following the Rising of 1916.’88 In part this ‘confusion’ arose because people were 
tired after ten years of violence, which by the late 1970s seemed to be primarily the 
responsibility of the IRA, in contrast to the 1968-72 period, when nationalists were 
seen as the victims of violence.89  
 
But identification with the idea of the ‘old’ IRA remained strong, as June Fitzgibbon 
indicated when she suggested that the IRA ‘used to be a great organisation at one 
time, didn’t they? But then they started all this killing.’90 A nephew of Michael 
Collins stressed during 1996 that the ‘old’ IRA had ‘kept the fight to the fighting 
areas, whereas the (Provisional) IRA has committed countless acts on violence on 
civilians in the past 25 years. That sort of violence did not happen in Collin’s time.’91 
If there were veterans prepared to endorse the Provisionals, there were also many who 
rejected them. As one ‘1916 man’ explained ‘this idea of planting a bloody big bomb 
here while you and I have a cup of tea, that’s not military work, that’s bloody 
assasinating people. That never happened in our day. Never.’92 Historian John A. 
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Murphy, speaking at the 1982 Béal na mBláth commemoration, claimed that the 
‘urban terrorist violence of the last 12 years…had no counterpart in the events of 60 
years ago, at least not on the Irish side.’ The enemy fought by Michael Collins had 
been ‘the British Crown and it’s imperial servants...devoid of popular support in the 
greater part of Ireland.’ For Murphy it was ‘a popular vote, a popular mandate, the 
popular will’ that distinguished ‘the IRA of Collin’s day from today’s gunmen and 
bombers.’ In contrast the Provisionals ‘operated without a proper mandate’ and were 
‘a self-appointed group who wish to terrorise the whole Unionist community.’93 
Murphy made it clear that he ‘profoundly’ disagreed with Cruise O’Brien’s assertions 
that endorsing the ‘old’ IRA meant legitimizing the Provisionals.94 Rejection of the 
Provo’s tactics also came from those who understood their appeal. Fianna Fáil’s Niall 
Andrews’ family were stepped in Anti-Treaty republicanism.95 He was one of only 
two TDs who attended the funeral of H-Block hunger striker Kieran Doherty in 1981 
out of a ‘sense of anger that Irish people were still dying in British jails.’96 But he was 
adamant that the IRA were ‘vicious thugs to be quite frank…I don’t think the IRA has 
any legitimacy in the eyes of the Irish people: they have no right to carry arms and to 
shoot anybody.’97 While Independent socialist TD Tony Gregory suggested that ‘you 
cannot ignore the fact that part of this country is occupied’ he also believed that ‘if 
you join the Provos you support all sorts of things that most people just would not 
support...I never support the use of miltary tactics against civilian targets and that’s 
what they do all the time.’98 
 
IRA operations could also disturb their own supporters. At the time of Bloody Sunday 
the legendary Cork IRA leader Tom Barry had spoken on Provisional platforms.99 But 
in 1976 he stressed that he ‘wouldn’t have done the Birmingham job (the 1974 pub 
bombings) if it was going to set Ireland free and flowing with milk and honey.’100 
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When IRA prisoners in Portlaoise went on hunger strike during 1977, Barry ‘refused 
point blank’ to allow his name be included on a petition of support. He told veteran 
activist Sighle Humphreys that ‘the men who were carrying out the recent 
killings…could not be called IRA…Since the hunger strike began he had been 
approached to use his influence in certain quarters but had refused and told whoever 
approached him that he should realise that his organisation was losing support from 
all quarters and they had only themselves to blame.’101 But while Barry was appalled 
by civilian casualties, he believed that the IRA did have a right to attack British 
soldiers.102 The 1916 veteran who opposed IRA bombings had ‘no objection to the 
Provos if they confine themselves to military targets.’103 Some opposition to the IRA 
campaign centred on civilian casualties with much more diverse views where the 
British Army or Northern security forces were concerned.104  
 
Toleration for aspects of the IRA’s campaign ebbed and flowed depending on events 
in the North. The H-Block hunger strikes of 1980-81 were the first occasion after 
1972 where substantial numbers of people, beyond republican ranks, took to the 
streets in the Republic.105 Some veteran republicans believed that Margaret Thatcher’s 
‘unyielding attitude (had) awakened the dormant patriotism’ of the South.106 
Certainly, as writer Gene Kerrigan noted ‘by the time Bobby Sands died it was 
apparent that the H-Block campaign in Dublin was attracting the support of several 
hundred working class kids.’107 This would encourage some republican strategists to 
see the young population of the urban ‘ghettos’ of the ‘Free State (as) the key to the 
overall struggle.’108 Journalist and activist Eamonn McCann was one of those who 
predicted gains for the Provisionals in Dublin because ‘they’ve got all the charisma, 
and all the buzz of having been involved in the armed struggle...and they’re people 
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who do things-they don’t just talk.’109  While significant in drawing in new activists, 
the popular impact of the strikes should not be exaggerated. During the first hunger 
strike a poll found only 5% approved of the IRA, while 41% admired their ideals but 
rejected their methods.110 While important to the republican movement politically, the 
electoral appeal of the H-Block prisoners was limited, nine candidates winning 33,682 
votes (2.1%) and having two TDs elected in the June 1981 general election.111 A 
young American visitor that summer reflected that having ‘thought that the majority 
of people in the South would support the H-Block hunger strikers and the idea of 
unity with the North, I soon found feelings were confused, complex and often, 
apathetic.’112 Unlike the more emotional upsurge after Bloody Sunday the hunger 
strikes also illustrated divisions that had emerged since 1972, with issues seeming 
much less clear-cut. 
 
 
Nevertheless a significant number of people were radicalised. One of them was the 
singer Christy Moore, whose father had been an Irish Army officer and his mother a 
Fine Gael supporter. According to Moore his mother, ‘as in the case of thousands of 
people around the country’, found ‘her Republicanism...re-awakened by the hunger-
strikers.’ When asked if he supported the IRA during 1983 Moore was refreshingly 
honest; ‘Yes... I find them quite amazing actually.’ He claimed that he ‘would like to 
be a pacifist. I would like to be romantic enough to believe that we could have justice 
in this country by peaceful means- but from my experience, its impossible.’113 Moore 
was one of very few musicians prepared to publicly endorse the IRA114, and his 
support was reciprocated, Martin McGuinness stating that he admired ‘Christy 
Moore- his music, his courage in Ireland where it is a popular thing to condemn 
republicans from one weekend to the next.’115 But Moore too, would be affected by 
the course of the armed struggle. In 1991 he explained how ‘at times like 
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Enniskillen…thinking of how Tom Oliver was killed and how a kitchen porter was 
used in a proxy bombing116, I find I’ve reached a point in my life where I can’t 
fucking take it anymore. After Enniskillen117...I find I can no longer support the 
armed struggle. Its reached a point of futility. It doesn’t seem possible to carry out an 
armed struggle against the enemy. It’s an armed struggle in which too many little 
people are blown away…there was a time when I was preoccupied with the war in the 
North. Now, I really do bring it down to a question of all the little people who are 
suffering and dying.’118 Despite early hopes, by 1992 it was also clear that substantial 
political growth had eluded the republican movement south of the border.119 The 
popular impact of incidents such as Enniskillen cannot be underestimated, as not only 
did public figures outdo ‘each other in their eagerness to distance themselves from 
those who committed the act’ but thousands of ordinary people reacted in similar 
ways, over 50,000 signing a book of condolence in Dublin.120  Journalist Derek 
Dunne, who had written sympathetically about republicanism121, noted the ‘wave of 
condemnation’ that ‘swept the country’ after Enniskillen and how in their ‘horror, 
shame and guilt’ people in ‘the South’ seemed to be ‘trying to atone for the deaths’.122 
Further evidence of the unpopularity of the IRA’s campaign came in another study 
undertaken by Mícheál MacGréil during 1988-1989. Just 11% of Dublin respondents 
thought ‘violence while regrettable, had been necessary’ in the Northern conflict 
(compared to 35% who felt this in 1972-73).123  Indeed over 50% of those surveyed 
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would have denied Irish citizenship to IRA members, while only 9.3% would have 
welcomed an IRA member into their immediate family.124 
 
 
While denouncing what they saw as the ‘hypocrisy of historical revisionism’ 
republicans ironically found common ground with some ‘revisionists’ when they 
drew links between the conflicts of 1916-21 and the North.125 As early as 1973 
George Colley had been alive to the danger of this trend when he warned that some 
‘would-be historians avail themselves of every opportunity to try to discredit the 
achievements and traditions of the old IRA…they like to equate the militant groups 
operating today with the army which upheld the Republic over half a century ago.’126 
The Good Old IRA’s claim that ‘nobody was asked to vote for war’ in 1918 echoed 
similar assertions by critics of the Irish republican tradition.127 Indeed republicans 
sometimes downplayed the level of popular support that had existed in the past. In 
1976 IRA leaders argued that ‘a revolutionary movement does not depend on a 
popular mandate as a basis for action. Its mandate comes from the justice and 
correctness of its cause and therein lies the basis for our mandate. The men of 1916 
and of 1920 had no mandate from the people.’128 Gerry Adams recalled discussions 
with Cork IRA veterans in which ‘one old man cast an interesting light on the way in 
which the Tan War has been projected as a glorious period in which the Irish people 
were united behind the IRA...he spoke about an ambush after which they could find 
no place to stay: no one would let them in anywhere.’ For Adams this suggested that 
‘it was a small number of republicans who advanced the struggle and it was only 
when that struggle was about to be successful that it enjoyed mass support.’129 In 
1971 Ruairí Ó Brádaigh explained that while ‘the mass of the people’ could be 
‘stirred on occasions of high dramatic situations like in Derry’s Bogside’ it was only 
‘a minority of people have always in the past and will in the future give solid 
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support.’130 Republicans could convince themselves that the ‘old’ IRA had been just 
as unpopular as the Provisionals at various points, but that with victory had come 
legitimacy. Therefore they would have to rely on minority support until they too were 
successful.  
 
Another response was to blame southerners themselves. In 1971, when addressing 
what she considered a poorly attended meeting in Limerick, Sinn Féin vice-president 
Máire Drumm wondered ‘if the people of Munster want us to be part of a free Ireland 
at all.’131 In 1973 Martin McGuinness demanded that southerners ‘take some course 
of action to impress on your cowardly government that unless something is done by 
them to remove the British Army by force of arms, the people of the 26 (counties) 
shall be regarded as cowards and traitors with a few honourable exceptions.’132 A 
1974 Provisional pamphlet claimed that ‘the people of the Six Counties are justifiably 
angry and bitterly disappointed that their suffering, their hardships, their struggle for 
survival have been viewed as less important than the price of Guinness in the rest of 
Ireland.’133 Danny Morrison lamented in 1989 that ‘there is a soulessness about the 26 
counties. They don’t have the moral strength to say ‘hey, what your’e doing to our 
brothers and sisters in the north is wrong, and we’re going to step into the ring and 
take you on.’134 This impression had been evident from as early as 1972 when 
republican activist Rita O’Hare suggested ‘it’s just unbelievable the apathy down 
here...the whole outlook is unbelievable...it’s as though we are not their people at 
all...this is my country but it’s just that the people don’t seem to care, or know, whats 
going on.’135 Nearly twenty years later, Gerry McGovern, an angry resident of west 
Belfast would rage that ‘the South sold the nationalists of the Six Counties into 
slavery. The 26 Counties bought its freedom by betraying the nationalists of the Six 
Counties.’136 Such arguments, though, it appeared, had little impact. In 1992 Eamonn 
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McCann noted how ‘attempts by Northern nationalists to guilt-trip southerners into a 
serious, active commitment to the anti-partition cause have failed.’137  
 
As the IRA campaign was rooted in the grievances of Northern Nationalists, hostility 
to it, and hostility to Nationalists themselves, could become intertwined. In 1974, 
Eamon Dunphy as a professional footballer with Charlton Athletic, had taken an 
unusual risk in speaking on a platform supporting the Price sisters, IRA prisoners then 
on hunger strike.138 Dunphy later admitted that he was then ‘prepared to countenance 
the murder of people’ but changed his views after ‘meeting IRA people who weren’t 
the Che Guevara types I’d romantically imagined.’ Instead he found them ‘crude, 
politically ignorant (and) glorying in their deeds.’ By 1990 he regarded the IRA as 
‘criminals.’139 Dunphy suggested that Southerners had ‘virtually no identification 
with Nationalists in Northern Ireland...by harbouring terrorists over the past 20 years 
they have forfeited their right to our unquestioned sympathy...our job in the Republic 
then is to tell the Nationalist community that it has behaved disgracefully.’140 The 
IRA’s campaign also caused reflection for journalist Vincent Browne, who had 
supported the H-Block protests and been critical of those who denounced violence 
without discussion of the roots of the conflict.141 In 1982 Browne wrote about how 
armed struggle had created a ‘sordid self-inflicted and nurtured culture which regards 
life with indifference, which embodies a language of obscene disregard for life, where 
stories are told of the infliction of death in an off-hand and sometimes boastful 
manner. This is a cancer which has degraded the republican tradition and indeed 
degraded our society as a whole, and most of all, those people who have become 
directly infected by it. i.e. the republicans themselves.’142  
 
While some republicans refused to see Southern criticism as anything other than the 
product of revisionism or censorship, others accepted that it had a basis. Ex-hunger-
striker Tommy McKearney, serving a life sentence, argued during 1990 that ‘a united 
                                                 
137 Eamonn McCann, Bloody Sunday in Derry: What Really Happened (Dingle, 1992) 
p. 4.  
138 Irish Times, 1 Feb. 1974. 
139 Hot Press, 1 Nov. 1990. 
140 Irish People, 7 April 1989. 
141 Magill, Sept. 1979, Dec. 1980, Aug. 1982. 
142 Magill, June 1982. 
 22 
Ireland is still little more than pub talk down South…most people in the Republic 
wouldn’t lose an hours sleep for a united Ireland let alone die for it. Surely that’s an 
indictment of the IRA’s inability to win any kind of national support for their 
cause?143 The former Peoples Democracy leader Michael Farrell, in the 1970s a 
strong, if critical, supporter of the Provisional IRA144, reflected that ‘Northern 
nationalists tend not to understand the South…their attitude is sometimes very much a 
moralistic sort of one- “We are oppressed, why don’t you come to our aid?” They 
make a quite legitimate point that a lot of the activities of the IRA are not very 
different from those of the IRA in the War of Independence. But that’s out of the 
direct memory of most people here now.’ Farrell observed that as a result of 
‘atrocities, completely indefensible actions and killings of civilians...a lot of people 
here have got very alienated...they have a sort of defence mechanism which is to turn 
off.’ He believed that censorship did have an impact on Southern preceptions but that 
‘some aspects of the violence you could explain till the cows come home and it would 
still turn people off: such as killing workmen at Teebane.’145 
 
Some republicans did acknowledge this. Discussing long standing Anti-Treatyite 
resentment of the ‘Free State’, which was ‘not always sufficently understood in the 
North’ a writer in An Phoblacht/Republican News cautioned that this resentment was 
‘confined to the tiny minority of activists.’ For ‘the vast majority’ of southerners it 
was social and economic problems, not Northern Ireland, which dominated their 
lives.146 Gerry Adams recognized this too, when he asserted that that ‘you can’t get 
support in Ballymun because of doors being kicked in by the Brits in 
Ballymurphy.’147 But much republican rhetoric had been based on the idea that people 
in Ballymun should support the IRA precisely because of ‘doors being kicked in by 
the Brits.’ Indeed republicans had seemed to threaten the South as well, Drumm 
asserting in 1972 that ‘we have fought the British Army, we have brought down 
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Stormont and we’ll bring down Leinster House.’148 At Bodenstown in 1971 Joe Cahill 
had promised that after Stormont was overthrown ‘Leinster House must go also. 
These two houses of deceit, betrayal and corruption must go...’149 In appealing for 
support the IRA stressed that ‘the war in the North is not a local affair for Belfast 
alone nor for the North alone but concerns everyone South and North alike, the fight 
in Belfast, Derry, in Newry, in Armagh is a National fight.’150  
 
By 1988 however Danny Morrison was arguing that ‘the IRA doesn’t claim to be 
representing the people in the twenty-six counties…the IRA claims to represent the 
IRA and the oppressed nationalists who support it…the IRA isn’t killing people in the 
name of the people of Limerick or Dublin.’151 In 1993 Morrison wrote from prison 
that ‘no one I know of in this jail has lifted a gun or planted a bomb in the name of the 
people of the Twenty-six counties.’152 This was a significant argument and a 
departure from traditional republican ideology, which claimed the IRA was the Irish 
army. By 2011 Martin McGuinness was prepared to accept that the Irish Defence 
Forces ‘are Óglaigh na hÉireann.’153 Indeed Sinn Féin argued that Martin 
McGuinness’s presidential bid was legitimate because ‘our country’s history is replete 
with journeys like Martin’s. De Valera, Aiken, Lemass, Collins, Cosgrave and 
MacBride, to name a few, all travelled historic journeys also.’154 Once republicans 
would have angrily rejected any suggestion that McGuinness’s ‘journey’ had 
something in common with those of Collins, de Valera or Cosgrave. Worries 
expressed by commentators that a victory for McGuinness would ‘legitimize’ the 
IRA’s campaign ignored this jettisoning of a major part of the Anti-Treaty ethos.155  
 
Indeed the Provisionals themselves accelerated much of the historical examination of 
previous armed struggles. Former IRA activist Anthony McIntyre suggests that ‘had 
the Provos fought a much more limited war against state repression rather than claim 
to be fighting a war of national liberation the amount of revisionist probing of the two 
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aforementioned wars (1916 and 1919-21) would not be anyhere near as great. I think 
what drew revisionist ire was the notion that small self appointed bodies could assume 
to speak in the name of the nation. If you listen to some of the arguments presented in 
defence of today’s (‘dissident’) activities you get a sense of how off the wall it can 
come across.’156 J. Bowyer Bell, in his classic study of the IRA, The Secret Army 
suggested that ‘CS gas did more for the Provos than all the legends of heroes and the 
patriot graves.’157 It could be argued that car bombs did more for revisionism than all 
the writings of Conor Cruise O’Brien and Ruth Dudley Edwards. 
 
Attitudes to the IRA in the republic were confused and contradictory because that is 
how most southerners felt about the conflict. The historical status attached to the IRA 
meant many people wanted to identify with them but were repulsed by their actions. 
The explanation given by a Northern nationalist to Fionnaula O’Connor that she did 
not ‘want them (the IRA) to be bad guys’ equally applied to many in the South.158 
Support for the IRA was often more widespread than many were prepared to admit 
and there were periods when aspects of the armed struggle could be tolerated. But fear 
and horror were often the overiding emotions produced by the violence. By the 1990s 
some Northerners were angered that people in the republic seemed more outraged by 
IRA atrocities than those of Loyalists, and far more excercised still by deaths caused 
by the IRA in Britain. ‘How many Irish children equal one English child?’ asked one 
woman after thousands had protested in Dublin following the Warrington bomb in 
1993. While real, this anger nevertheless missed an important factor.159 Most 
Southern nationalists identified historically with the idea of the IRA. They saw its 
actions as supposedly representing them and their history. The Loyalists had no such 
cachet, with nobody in the Republic nostalgic about having a grandparent in the ‘old’ 
UVF. A recent popular history has astutely noted that the belief ‘that the members of 
the Provisional IRA were the heirs of those who had won independence might be the 
only thing Ruairí Ó Brádaigh and Conor Cruise O’Brien would ever agree on.’160 
Most southern Irish nationalists rejected this proposition however, instead identifying 
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with the sentiments of Fianna Fáil’s Erskine Childers that ‘the IRA of those days (the 
War of Independence) had completely different objectives and ideals to those who 
called themselves by the same name today.’161 Another indication of this belief came 
on the 75th anniversary of the Easter Rising in 1991. An Irish Independent survey 
found 65% of respondents expressed pride in the Rising, with 58% believing the 
rebels were right to take up arms. But 66% were also sure that the 1916 insurgents 
would oppose the modern IRA’s activities.162  A major factor in southern rejection of 
the Provisionals campaign was a widespread belief in an ‘old IRA’ which, with 
overwhelming popular support, had waged a ‘noble’ fight for independence between 
1916 and 1921.  
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